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COMMENTS 
CONGRESS BLEWETT BY NOT 
EXPLICITLY MAKING THE FAIR 
SENTENCING ACT OF 2010 RETROACTIVE 
Andrew Cockroft* 
 
In 2013, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals was the first Circuit Court 
to retroactively apply the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010. The Fair Sentencing 
Act sought to end the discriminatory effects of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 
1986 and its treatment of one gram of crack cocaine as the equivalent to one 
hundred grams of powder cocaine. The Fair Sentencing Act was meant to 
remedy the injustices brought about by the infamous 100:1 ratio in crack-
cocaine and powder cocaine minimum sentencing. Despite this purpose, the 
Fair Sentencing Act does not contain language that explicitly and 
unequivocally requires that the new mandatory minimums be applied 
retroactively. Thus, a narrow reading of the Fair Sentencing Act would mean 
that individuals sentenced under mandatory minimums that the law 
acknowledged were, at the very least, perpetuating a racially discriminatory 
system, would have to serve out those sentences. The Sixth Circuit in Blewett 
v. United States held that a reading of the Fair Sentencing Act that did not 
allow for retroactive application of the more lenient and less dubious 
mandatory minimums created equal protection concerns that mandated 
reading the text to allow for retroactive application. Although the original 
Blewett panel decision has been heavily criticized, vacated, and eventually 
overturned en banc, this Comment argues that the original Blewett panel was 
correct in holding that equal protection requires reading the text of the Fair 
Sentencing Act to allow for retroactive application.  
  
 
* J.D., cum laude, Northwestern Pritzker School of Law, 2015; B.A., University of Texas, 
Austin, 2012. I would like to thank my parents, Randall and Susan Cockroft, for their love and 
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INTRODUCTION 
Congress passed the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 (“FSA”)1 in an attempt 
to remedy the discriminatory effects of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 
(“the Drug Act”).2 The Drug Act included mandatory minimums for the 
possession of crack cocaine; it "treat[ed] one gram of crack cocaine as 
equivalent to one hundred grams of powder cocaine for sentencing 
purposes."3 The sentencing regime based on the 100:1 ratio led to the mass 
incarceration of offenders, most of whom were black.4 The dramatic racial 
disparity in drug sentencing led to the passage of the FSA.5 
The FSA lessened the mandatory minimum ratio between crack and 
powder cocaine from 100:1 to 18:1.6 However, in passing the FSA, Congress 
did not include explicit language requiring that the new mandatory 
 
1 Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372 (2010). 
2 The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (1986). 
3 United States v. Blewett, 719 F.3d 482, 484 (6th Cir. 2013). See also The Anti-Drug 
Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (1986). 
4 See U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, Special Report to the Congress: Cocaine and Federal 
Sentencing Policy: Chapter 7D (Feb. 1995); U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2011 SOURCEBOOK 
OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS Table 34 (2011). See also Danielle Kurtzleben, Data 
Show Racial Disparity in Crack Sentencing, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT (Aug. 3, 2010, 2:45 
PM), http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2010/08/03/data-show-racial-disparity-in-crack-
sentencing, archived at http://perma.cc/U472-95CJ. 
5 See infra text accompanying notes 192-204 for a discussion of the legislative history 
behind the passage of the FSA. See also Marc Mauer, Beyond the Fair Sentencing Act, THE 
NATION (Dec. 9, 2010), available at http://www.thenation.com/article/157009/beyond-fair-
sentencing-act, archived at http://perma.cc/LL9Y-RBL9. 
6 Fair Sentencing Act, 111 P.L. 220, 124 Stat. 2372, 2373 (2010). 
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minimums be applied retroactively. That is, the FSA did not include explicit, 
undeniable language that would allow offenders sentenced under the old 
sentencing regime of the Drug Act to benefit from the new, fairer mandatory 
minimums. 
In 2013, the original panel in United States v. Blewett faced the problem 
raised by this lack of explicit language.7 Because the FSA lacked such 
language, the original Blewett panel was left to find ways to make the FSA 
realize its purpose: reducing the racial disparities in drug sentencing.8 The 
panel relied on equal protection jurisprudence as well as the doctrine of 
constitutional avoidance in holding that the FSA ought to apply 
retroactively.9 Although the opinion has been heavily criticized and 
ultimately overturned after a rehearing en banc,10 this Comment argues that 
the original Blewett panel correctly decided that the FSA ought to apply 
retroactively. 
This Comment will proceed with the following parts. Part I describes 
the history of crack sentencing, beginning with the passage of the Drug Act 
in 1986. This part will detail the events leading to the passage of the Drug 
Act and its effects, ultimately resulting in the passage of the FSA and the 
original Blewett decision. Part I concludes with an overview of the reasoning 
of the original Blewett decision. Part II will analyze the jurisprudence on 
which the Blewett decision relies, including the law surrounding equal 
protection and the doctrine of constitutional avoidance. Part III will 
demonstrate how the original Blewett panel correctly articulated and used 
these doctrines to hold that the FSA ought to apply retroactively. This Part 
also provides an in-depth discussion of the various criticisms of the court’s 
decision. A brief conclusion summarizes the discussion of the preceding parts 
and discusses the implications of the original Blewett decision and its 
ultimate reversal. 
 
7 Blewett, 719 F.3d at 482. 
8 See Letter from Patrick J. Leahy, Chairman, U.S. Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, to, 
U.S. Sen., to the Honorable Patti B. Saris, U.S. Sent. Comm. (June 1, 2011) available at http://
www.ussc.gov/Meetings_and_Rulemaking/Public_Comment/20110602/Durbin_Leahy_
Franken_Coons_Comment.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/CC55-6SCD. 
9 Blewett, 719 F.3d at 484. See also infra text accompanying notes 149-163 for a 
discussion of the doctrine of constitutional avoidance. 
10 See United States v. Blewett, 746 F.3d 647, 649 (6th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 
1779 (2014) (hereafter described as “Blewett II.”). 
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I. BACKGROUND 
Although the federal government’s “War on Drugs” began with the 
Nixon administration,11 in the 1980s, law enforcement officials increased 
their effort to stamp out casual drug use. These efforts coincided with the 
proliferation of a new drug trend in the United States: in the late seventies 
and early eighties cocaine began growing in popularity.12 Crack cocaine came 
to the national spotlight following the death of basketball star Len Bias, who 
died after reportedly using the drug following his selection by the Boston 
Celtics in the first round of the 1986 NBA Draft.13 Congress, amid the 
hysteria surrounding this new drug, passed the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 
(“the Drug Act”),14 which created new mandatory minimum sentences for 
defendants convicted of possessing or using a series of drugs, including crack 
cocaine.15 The Drug Act instituted a 100:1 ratio between crack cocaine and 
powder cocaine, treating one gram of crack cocaine as equivalent to one 
hundred grams of powder cocaine for sentencing purposes.16 A first-time 
possessor of a small amount of crack cocaine would face a mandatory 
sentence of five years in prison;17 however, the same person found to be 
possessing powder cocaine would have to be in possession of one hundred 
times that amount to warrant the same five-year sentence.18 
The circumstances surrounding the enactment of those mandatory 
minimums led to many constitutional challenges to the law. Challengers 
claimed the law violated the Equal Protection Clause and cited various news 
articles introduced in the Congressional Record that labeled crack dealers as 
 
11 See President Richard Nixon, Special Message to the Congress on Drug Abuse 
Prevention and Control (June 17, 1971), available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?
pid=3048, archived at http://perma.cc/59K8-35U8. 
12 See LaJuana Davis, Rock, Powder, Sentencing—Making Disparate Impact Evidence 
Relevant in Crack Cocaine Sentencing, 14 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 375, 381 (2011) (citing 
Eva Bertram et al., Drug War Politics: The Price of Denial, 61-62 (1996); Doris Marie Provine, 
Unequal Under Law: Race in the War on Drugs 76-77 (2007)). 
13 See id.; see also Julie Stewart, Well Done Congress, Now Make Fair Sentencing Act 
Retroactive, THE HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 4, 2010, 5:11 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
julie-stewart/well-done-congress-now-ma_b_671008.html. It is worth noting that the reports 
of Bias’ death from the use of crack cocaine have recently come under scrutiny. See Michael 
Weinreb, The Day Innocence Died, ESPN THE MAGAZINE, available at http://www.espn.com/
espn/eticket/story?page=bias. 
14 See Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (1986). 
15 See id. 
16 See id. 
17 See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B) (2006). 
18 Id. 
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black youths and gangs,19 and expressed concern that crack cocaine "would 
spill out of the ghettos" and find its way into the suburbs.20 Moreover, 
challengers argued that the procedural irregularities surrounding the passage 
of the new mandatory minimums indicated a discriminatory purpose behind 
the law.21 For example, Congress held very few hearings on the enhanced 
penalties and although the penalty ratio was originally set at 50:1 between 
crack and powder cocaine, the ratio was doubled for arguably no reason.22 
Despite this evidence, these challenges were not successful and the Drug Act 
was upheld.23 
Since its enactment, the Anti-Drug Abuse Act has had disastrous 
consequences on the African-American community. The 100:1 crack cocaine 
ratio has led to the imprisonment of thousands of offenders, most of whom 
are black.24 The statistics are alarming. The U.S. Sentencing Commission 
projected that approximately 30,000 federal prisoners would be serving crack 
cocaine sentences by the end of 2011.25 In 2011, 83% of those prisoners were 
black.26 In just one year, 2010, 92.7% of all crack cocaine defendants were 
non-white, and the majority of them (78.5%) were black.27 Between 1988 and 
1995, federal prosecutors did not bring a single case against a white person 
"under the crack provision in seventeen states, including major cities such as 
Boston, Denver, Chicago, Miami, Dallas, and Los Angeles."28 
 
19 See United States v. Clary, 846 F. Supp. 768, 783 n.48 (E.D. Mo. 1994) rev’d 34 F.3d 
709 (8th Cir. 1994) (citing 132 Cong. Rec. S2495 (daily ed. Mar. 12, 1986) (“[B]ig city 
ghettos” are “infested with . . . crack houses” and “are centers of the new cocaine trade” in 
crack); 132 Cong. Rec. S4670 (daily ed. April 22, 1986) (“Most of the dealers, as with past 
drug trends, are black or Hispanic . . . [w]hites rarely sell the cocaine rocks.”); 132 Cong. Rec. 
S7123 (daily ed. June 9, 1986) (Dealers “organize small cells of pushers, couriers and lookouts 
from the ghetto’s legion of unemployed teenagers.”). 
20 Id. at 783–84. 
21 Id. at 784–85. 
22 Id. 
23 See, e.g., United States v. Clary, 34 F.3d 709, 714 (8th Cir. 1994). 
24 See Kurtzleben, supra note 4; see also United States v. Blewett, 719 F.3d 482, 485 (6th 
Cir. 2013). 
25 U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, Analysis of the Impact of Guideline Implementation of the 
Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 if the Amendment Were Applied Retroactively, at 11-12 (May 
2011). 
26 U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, Annual Report 2011 at 37. 
27 U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2011 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS 
Table 34 (2011). 
28 United States v. Blewett, 719 F.3d 482, 487 (6th Cir. 2013) (citing Dan Weikel, War on 
Crack Targets Minorities over Whites, L.A. TIMES, May 21, 1995, http://articles.latimes.com/
1995–05–21/news/mn-4468_1_crack–cocaine). 
1. COCKROFT (JWM Final) 6/15/2017 6:53 PM 
330 COCKROFT [Vol. 107 
After acknowledging that the 100:1 sentencing ratio was the “primary 
cause of the growing disparity between sentences for Black and White federal 
defendants,”29 the United States Sentencing Commission recommended that 
Congress reduce the sentencing ratio in 199530 and unanimously 
recommended reducing the ratio in 199731 and 2002.32 Even after adjusting 
the length of sentences for crack in 2007, Congress made no changes to the 
100:1 ratio.33 
Finally, in 2010, Congress passed the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 
(FSA),34 scaling back the harsh and racially disparate mandatory sentences 
for crack offenses.35 The FSA changed the ratio between crack and powder 
cocaine from 100:1 to 18:1 in order “to restore fairness to Federal cocaine 
sentencing.”36 The statute took effect on August 3, 2010.37 
When it was passed, it was unclear how the FSA would affect 
individuals sentenced under the old regime.38 In passing the act, Congress 
failed to include language that the FSA ought to apply retroactively—that is, 
there was no explicit language stating that the act’s new sentencing standards 
should apply to individuals convicted or sentenced prior to the enactment of 
the FSA. In May 2011, the United States Sentencing Commission produced 
a study which indicated that if the FSA were to apply retroactively, more than 
12,000 offenders would be eligible to receive a reduced sentence.39 
In 2012, in Dorsey v. United States, the Supreme Court considered the 
case of several offenders who were charged with and convicted of crack 
offenses prior to the enactment of the FSA, but had not been sentenced until 
 
29 U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, SPECIAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: COCAINE AND FEDERAL 
SENTENCING POLICY, Chapter 7D (1995). 
30 Id. at Chapter 8. 
31 U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, SPECIAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: COCAINE AND FEDERAL 
SENTENCING POLICY 2 (1997). 
32 U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: COCAINE AND FEDERAL 
SENTENCING POLICY, at viii (2002). 
33 Blewett, 719 F.3d at 488. 
34 Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372 (2010). 
35 Mauer, supra note 5. 
36 Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, 111 Pub.L. 220, 124 Stat. 2372, 2373. (2010). 
37 Id. 
38 See Mauer, supra note 5; see also Stewart, supra note 13. 
39 Memorandum from Office of Research & Data & Office of Gen. Counsel to Chair Saris, 
et al., Analysis of the Impact of Guideline Implementation of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 
if the Amendment Were Applied Retroactively 10 (May 20, 2011) (“These offenders were 
sentenced between October 1, 1991, and September 30, 2010 (fiscal years 1992 through 2010), 
and remained incarcerated as of November 1, 2011.”). 
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after the law had passed.40 After acknowledging that the passage of the FSA 
was, in part, motivated by public outcry over unjustified race-based 
differences in sentencing,41 the Court held in favor of the criminal 
offenders.42 The Court held that “Congress intended the Fair Sentencing 
Act’s new, lower mandatory minimums to apply to the post-Act sentencing 
of pre-Act offenders.”43 However, the Court left open the question of whether 
the FSA would apply retroactively to all pre-Act offenders, regardless of 
when their sentencing occurred. Even with the holding in Dorsey, there are 
still countless crack offenders in federal prison serving sentences given to 
them prior to the enactment of the FSA. 
Since the passage of the FSA, there have been numerous attempts to 
force the law to apply fully retroactively. Until the summer of 2013, every 
circuit court to hear the issue found that the FSA should not apply to these 
offenders.44 However, in United State v. Blewett, the Sixth Circuit Court of 
Appeals became the first circuit court to hold that the FSA’s new crack to 
powder cocaine ratio ought to apply fully retroactively.45 The key difference 
between the Blewett court and every other court to consider the issue is that 
the Blewett court analyzed the issue of retroactivity as a constitutional 
question, not merely as a question of statutory interpretation.46 
The court in Blewett held that the equal protection principles of the Fifth 
Amendment required that the FSA apply retroactively.47 The court 
acknowledged that when the old 100:1 crack–powder ratio was adopted “it 
presumably did not violate the Equal Protection Clause because there was no 
intent or design to discriminate on a racial basis.”48 According to the court, 
 
40 Dorsey v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2321, 2326 (2012). 
41 Id. at 2328. 
42 Id. at 2335. 
43 Id. It is important to note that the court only faced a question of statutory construction, 
not a constitutional challenge to the FSA. 
44 See United States v. Augustine, 712 F.3d 1290, 1293-1295 (9th Cir. 2013) (holding that 
the FSA does not apply retroactively and agreeing with every other circuit considering this 
question at the time); see also United States v. Kelly, 716 F.3d 180, 181–82 (5th Cir. 2013); 
United States v. Lucero, 713 F.3d 1024, 1026–27 (10th Cir. 2013); Paul J. Larkin, Jr., Crack 
Cocaine, Congressional Inaction, and Equal Protection, 37 HARV. J.  L. & PUB. POL’Y 241, 
243 (describing that Blewett was the first circuit court decision upholding an equal protection 
challenge to federal drug sentencing laws). 
45 United States v. Blewett, 719 F.3d 482 (6th Cir. 2013); see also Larkin supra note 44. 
at 243. 
46 Compare id. at 487 with Kelly, 716 F.3d at 181–82; Lucero, 713 F.3d at 1026; Augustine, 
712 F.3d at 1293–95. 
47 Blewett, 719 F.3d at 487. 
48 Id. at 488. 
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“[s]ince 1986, however, we have gained knowledge of the old statute’s 
devastating effect on blacks.”49 
The court’s equal protection analysis proceeded in three parts. First, 
judicial action qualifies as state action for the purposes of equal protection.50 
The court is bound by the same constitutional obligations as legislatures or 
administrative agencies because when the court acts so does the state.51 The 
Constitution prohibits giving legal effect to the discriminatory acts of others, 
even if they are private parties.52 
Second, if the court gave legal effect to the 100:1 ratio knowing what 
we know now about its racial implications, such an act would become 
intentional discrimination for the purpose of equal protection.53 A “‘disparate 
impact’ case now becomes an intentional subjugation or discriminatory 
purpose case.”54 This is consistent with the Supreme Court’s requirement of 
sufficient intent to find a violation of equal protection.55 This finding of intent 
is bolstered by the legislative history of the FSA, because part of the reason 
for passing the FSA was to remedy the racially discriminatory effects of the 
100:1 crack-cocaine ratio.56 
Essentially, while a statute may not violate equal protection if it only 
has a discriminatory impact, the FSA is different. The passage of the FSA 
was a Congressional acknowledgement that the old sentencing regime had a 
discriminatory impact. If the court were to give legal effect to something that 
Congress rejected as discriminatory, then the court would impose the 
discrimination that the FSA sought to avoid. 
Third, the court is constrained to “interpret statutes and sentencing 
guidelines so as to avoid potential conflict with the Constitution.”57 Here, the 
court reasoned that the interpretation of the statute offered by the 
Government would result in a violation of equal protection, thus requiring 
that the court interpret the statute so as to avoid that constitutional violation.58 
 
49 Id. 
50 Id. at 490. 
51 Id. 
52 Id. at 489–90 (citing Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1948); Ex Parte Virginia, 
100 U.S. 339, 348-49 (1880)). 
53 See id. at 489 (“There is no excuse for judges to engage in perpetuating such 
discrimination or to sanction it by refusing to correct it.”). 
54 See id. at 488 (“Like slavery and Jim Crow laws, the intentional maintenance of 
discriminatory sentence is a denial of equal protection.”). 
55 Id. at 488–89 (citing McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 292–298 (1987); Pers. Adm’r 
of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979); Washington v. Davis, 429 U.S. 229 (1976)). 
56 Id. at 489. 
57 Id. at 487. 
58 Id. 
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Here the court uses the doctrine of constitutional avoidance to interpret the 
FSA such that the imposition of unconstitutional discrimination can be 
avoided.59 
The court’s decision has been heavily criticized,60 most notably by the 
dissent61 with which at least one federal district court explicitly agrees,62 as 
well as the majority in Blewett I.63 Critics present four main arguments. First, 
they argue that the original Blewett panel would turn every disparate impact 
case into an intentional discrimination case.64 According to this argument, 
the original Blewett panel contradicts precedent indicating that a disparate 
impact alone is insufficient to show a violation of equal protection. 
Second, critics argue that applying the FSA retroactively assumes that a 
party can show a violation of equal protection by Congress’s failure to act. 
This criticism relies on the original Blewett panel’s discussion of how the 
FSA remedied the past discrimination resulting from the mandatory 
minimums of the Drug Act. These critics state that to find a violation of equal 
protection, the court must either reason that Congress intentionally 
discriminated in passing the FSA or that Congress’s failure to remedy the 
disparate impact of the Drug Act is constitutionally actionable.65 
Third, the majority in Blewett II argued that there was a simple 
explanation, one other than discrimination, for Congress's decision to not 
apply the FSA retroactively: the state's interest in the finality of sentences.66 
According to the majority, it would make little sense for Congress to be 
"deeply concerned about racial justice when looking at future sentences" and 
then "suddenly bec[o]me racist when contemplating past 
 
59 The Blewett court elaborated on the doctrine of constitutional avoidance. Id. at 487 
(“[W]here a statute is susceptible of two constructions, by one of which grave and doubtful 
constitutional questions arise and by the other of which such questions are avoided, our duty 
is to adopt the latter.”) (citations omitted). 
60 See, e.g., Larkin, supra note 44; Ed Whelan, Crackheaded Ruling by the Sixth Circuit, 
NATIONAL REVIEW ONLINE (May 17, 2013, 1:57 PM), available at http://www.nationalreview.
com/bench-memos/348668/crackheaded-ruling-sixth-circuit-ed-whelan, archived at http://
perma.cc/8FN6-JQK4. 
61 Blewett, 719 F.3d at 495–97 (Gilman, J., dissenting). 
62 See United States v. Duty, 1:08CR00024-032, 2013 WL 3873076, at *5, n.5 (D. Va. 
July 25, 2013) (“I agree with the dissent in Blewett that the constitutional argument is 
invalid.”). 
63 United States v. Blewett, 746 F.3d 647, 649 (6th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 
1779 (2014). 
64 Blewett, 719 F.3d at 495–98 (Gilman, J., dissenting). 
65 Larkin, supra note 44, at 252–54; Whelan, supra note 60. 
66 Blewett II, 746 F.3d at 659. 
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sentences[.]"67Because the state has an interest in maintaining the sentences 
already imposed, Congress chose to have the new minimums be exclusively 
prospective.68 
Fourth, critics state that the Blewett panel improperly invoked the 
doctrine of constitutional avoidance, since the sentencing guidelines and the 
FSA are not subject to two possible interpretations.69 This argument relies on 
the Sixth Circuit decision in United States v. Hammond, where the court 
considered whether the FSA, as read, requires retroactive application of the 
new, lower mandatory minimums.70 That court held that the best 
interpretation of the FSA foreclosed retroactive application.71 As such, critics 
state that the original Blewett panel could not invoke any other interpretation 
of the FSA other than the one enunciated by the court in Hammond.72 
Following the decision of the original Blewett panel, the Sixth Circuit 
Court of Appeals decided to vacate the decision and scheduled a rehearing 
for the case en banc.73 In December 2013, the Sixth Circuit overturned the 
panel decision, applying the same logic as the Blewett dissent.74 Despite the 
decision, several offenders sentenced under the 100:1 crack–powder ratio 
have cited the opinion in an attempt to have their sentences reduced, although 
none have been successful.75 
While the decision was overturned and heavily criticized, this Comment 
argues that the original Blewett panel correctly decided that the FSA ought to 
apply retroactively to defendants sentenced under the Anti-Drug Abuse Act 
of 1986. Congress’s decision to change the standards for crack sentencing 
based on the old sentencing ratio’s discriminatory effect on African-
Americans presents a unique issue. The original Blewett panel’s decision—
that enforcement of the old sentencing regime violated the Fifth 
Amendment—was consistent with equal protection jurisprudence. Before 




69 Blewett, 719 F.3d at 496–97 (Gilman, J., dissenting). 
70 Id. at 496; see also United States v. Hammond, 712 F.3d 333, 335 (6th Cir. 2013). 
71 Hammond. 712 F.3d at 336. 
72 Blewett, 719 F.3d at 496–97 (Gilman, J., dissenting). 
73 See Order at 1, United States v. Blewett, No. 12–5226 (6th Cir. July 11, 2013), ECF No. 
111; Order at 1, United States v. Blewett, No. 12–5582 (6th Cir. July 11, 2013), ECF No. 104. 
74 See United States v. Blewett, 746 F.3d 647, 660 (6th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 
1779 (2014). 
75 See, e.g., United States v. Swangin, 726 F.3d 205, 207 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 2013); United 
States v. Bell, 731 F.3d 552, 554 (6th Cir. 2013); United States v. Drewery, 531 Fed. App’x 
675, 682–83 (6th Cir. 2013); United States v. Reeves, 717 F.3d 647, 650–51 (8th Cir. 2013). 
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decision's critics, it is necessary to analyze the jurisprudence on which the 
decision relies. 
II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE ON WHICH THE BLEWETT PANEL 
RELIES 
In order to successfully claim that his or her right to equal protection has 
been violated, a party must demonstrate that a state actor has intentionally 
discriminated against them.76 A showing of intentional discrimination does 
not necessarily mean that the discrimination is evident from the face of the 
law itself.77 Instead, a party may show intentional discrimination through the 
grouping of a variety of factors including the procedure preceding the 
passage of the law, the law’s discriminatory effect, the legislative intent, and 
the statements of the legislators themselves.78 
It is often the case that a party may not argue that the law in question 
ought to be invalidated. Instead, the party may simply show that the law is 
subject to at least two interpretations, one of which avoids an interpretation 
of the statute that introduces questions of the statute's constitutionality. In 
certain cases, the court, based on the doctrine of constitutional avoidance,79 
may choose the construction of the statute that avoids such questions.  
A. EQUAL PROTECTION AND STATE ACTION 
Although the Fifth Amendment does not contain an Equal Protection 
Clause, the Supreme Court has held that the federal government is subject to 
the same equal protection restrictions under the Amendment as state 
governments are under the Fourteenth Amendment.80 The Equal Protection 
Clause only applies to state action, not private action. The Equal Protection 
Clause voids all state action of every kind that denies any of its citizens the 
equal protection of the laws.81 Executive and legislative acts by the state or 
federal government clearly fall within the meaning of state action.82 
In Shelley v. Kraemer, the Supreme Court considered whether action on 
the part of the judiciary in enforcing racially discriminatory agreements 
constitutes state action within the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause, 
 
76 See Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11, 17 (1883). 
77 Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 241 (1976). 
78 Id. at 241–44. 
79 See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2594 (2012). 
80 See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 224 (1995); Bolling v. Sharpe, 
347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954). 
81 See Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 11 (1883). 
82 See id.at 17. 
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when the action taken by the court is the enforcement of a racially 
discriminatory covenant.83 The Court concluded that if the agreements were 
purely voluntary and lacked the involvement of the judiciary, then a 
restrictive covenant standing alone could not be regarded as a violation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.84 The Court, however, stressed that the judicial 
enforcement of the covenants brought them into the realm of state action.85 
The Court held that the action of state courts and of judicial officers in 
their official capacities constitutes state action.86 According to the Court, acts 
of the judiciary have been held to be acts of the state since “the earliest cases 
involving the construction of the terms of the Fourteenth Amendment.”87 In 
supporting that judicial action constitutes state action within the meaning of 
the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court cited numerous examples of the 
different types of state action the judiciary can take. First, the judiciary 
enforces the laws of the state and therefore its acts constitute state action.88 
Second, the Supreme Court has found violations of the Fourteenth 
Amendment when the judiciary of a state applies common-law policies.89 
Third, the Supreme Court ruled that the judiciary acts in enforcing common-
law crimes.90 
In applying these principles, the Court found that the enforcement of 
racially restrictive covenants constituted state action “in the full and complete 
sense of the phrase.”91 But for the intervention of state courts, supported by 
the full panoply of state power, the covenants would have no legal effect.92 
Thus, since the effect of the state action in question was to deny rights subject 
 
83 Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 4 (1948). 
84 Id. at 13. 
85 Id. at 14. 
86 Id. 
87 Id. (citing Commonwealth of Va. v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313, 318 (1880) (“It is doubtless 
true that a State may act through different agencies,—either by its legislative, its executive, or 
its judicial authorities; and the prohibitions of the amendment extend to all action of the State 
denying equal protection of the laws, whether it be action by one of these agencies or by 
another.”)). 
88 Id. at 15 (citing Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 90– 91 (1908) (“The judicial act 
of the highest court of the State, in authoritatively construing and enforcing its laws, is the act 
of the state.”)). 
89 Id. at 17 (citing American Fed’n of Labor v. Swing, 312 U.S. 321 (1941)). 
90 Id. at 17–18 (citing Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 
310 U.S. 296 (1940)). 
91 Id. at 19. 
92 Id. 
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to equal protection, it was the “obligation of this Court to enforce the 
constitutional commands.”93 
The Court in Shelley makes clear that acts of the judiciary constitute 
state action. Moreover, the Shelley court clarifies that the judiciary acts as the 
state within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment when it construes and 
enforces the laws of the legislature.94 Since judicial acts constitute state 
action within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, even when a court 
serves as an interpreter of the law, the original Blewett panel correctly 
understood its constitutional obligations in deciding the retroactivity of the 
Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 if reinforcing the mandatory minimums of the 
Drug Act after the passage of the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 would have 
violated the Equal Protection Clause. 
B. EQUAL PROTECTION AND THE REQUIREMENT OF INTENT 
To show a violation of the equal protection principles of the Fifth 
Amendment, a party must show that the state intentionally discriminated 
against an individual within a protected group;95 however, the Supreme Court 
has held that a law or another official act cannot be unconstitutional solely 
because it has a racially disproportionate impact.96 To find that a law violates 
the equal protection principles of the Fifth Amendment, a court must find that 
the law or the official act had a discriminatory purpose.97 However, the 
discriminatory purpose does not need to be express on the face of the statute 
or within the official act.98 An inference of racial classification can be shown 
in the absence of an outright, facially racial classification.99 An intentionally 
discriminatory purpose may often be “inferred from the totality of the 
relevant facts,” including, in some cases, whether the law “bears more 
heavily on one race than another.”100 
In Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Corporation, 
the Court identified three general factors to consider when analyzing whether 
an official act or a statute was motivated by discriminatory intent in the 
 
93 Id. at 20. 
94 Id. at 15 (citing Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 90–91 (1908) (“The judicial act 
of the highest court of the State, in authoritatively construing and enforcing its laws, is the act 
of the state.”)). 
95 Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976). 
96 Id. 
97 Id. (citing Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954)). 
98 Id. at 241. 
99 Id.; Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 374 (1886). 
100 Davis, 426 U.S. at 242. 
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absence of an outright statutory classification.101 There, the Court's analysis 
“suggest[s] that certain inferences could be drawn based on our 
knowledge and expectations of the operations of legislatures.”102 These 
factors provide courts the ability to infer a decisionmaker's subjective, 
discriminatory intent by “relying on the historical and social context of the 
decision.”103  
First, a showing of a clear pattern, “unexplainable on grounds other than 
race,” of a disparity between one class and another can evidence a 
discriminatory purpose.104 The Court, however, stressed that “such cases are 
rare.”105 In the past, the Supreme Court has found intentional state action only 
when the disparate impact on a protected class is quite stark.  
As an example, the Court in Village of Arlington Heights cites Yick Wo 
v. Hopkins.106 Yick Wo involved a state administrative agency’s decision to 
bar virtually all persons of Chinese descent from receiving the proper 
paperwork to continue operating their laundry businesses.107 Of the 200 
persons of Chinese descent that applied for the proper permit, none were 
granted a permit to operate.108 “Absent a pattern as stark” as the one 
established in Yick Wo, disparate impact alone usually cannot establish 
discriminatory intent.109 
Second, the procedural background of the legislative or administrative 
decision, including the sequence of events leading up to the decision, may 
also be used to show the purpose of the decisionmaker.110 Those sorts of 
events include “departures from the normal procedural sequence” which may 
show that “improper purposes are playing a role.”111 If factors usually 
considered to be important by the decisionmaker strongly favor a conclusion 
contrary to the one reached, such departures could show that a decision was 
motivated by an intent to discriminate.112 
 
101 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977) (“Determining whether invidious discriminatory purpose was 
a motivating factor demands a sensitive inquiry into such circumstantial and direct evidence 
of intent as may be available.”). 
102 Michael Selmi, Proving Intentional Discrimination: The Reality of Supreme Court 
Rhetoric, 86 GEO. L.J. 279, 305 (1997). 
103 Sheila Foster, Intent and Incoherence, 72 TUL. L. REV. 1065, 1077 (1998). 
104 Id. (citations omitted). 
105 Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266. 
106 Id.; Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886). 
107 Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 374. 
108 Id. at 359. 
109 Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266. 
110 Id. at 267. 
111 Id. 
112 Id. 
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Third, the legislative or administrative history, including statements 
made by decisionmakers, may be “highly relevant, especially where there are 
contemporary statements by members of the decisionmaking body, minutes 
of its meetings, or reports.”113 In discussing every other factor, the Court 
merely speaks of each factor’s “relevan[ce].”114 However, the Court finds that 
the legislative history to not just be relevant, but potentially “highly 
relevant.”115 Statements of legislators, whether they directly or indirectly 
acknowledge the purpose of the law or decision, take on a great 
importance.116 
If, upon applying these factors to a statute or an official act, a court finds 
that the act in question was motivated by a discriminatory purpose, then 
“judicial deference is no longer justified.”117 The discriminatory purpose 
behind an official act does not need to be the primary or but-for cause of a 
decision.118 Rather, the Equal Protection Clause is violated when 
discrimination was “a motivating factor in the decision.”119 The Court 
emphasized that parties are not required to show that a decision was based 
solely on a discriminatory purpose or “even that a particular [discriminatory] 
purpose was the ‘dominant’ or ‘primary’ one,” since rarely do legislatures or 
administrative bodies make decisions “motivated solely by a single 
concern.”120 The Court’s deference to the legislature and administrative 
agencies is based on the notion that these political branches “are properly 
concerned with balancing numerous competing considerations” which causes 
courts to refrain from reviewing the merits of the political branches’ 
decisions, “absent a showing of arbitrariness or irrationality.”121 Requiring a 
showing of but-for causation would be an unreasonable burden on any 
complaining party. Legislatures and administrative agencies make decisions 
based on a variety of factors, making it difficult to assess which factors, in 
fact, caused these decisions to be made. Thus, these factors are not meant to 
divine the only purpose of a given decision; instead, the factors are only 
 
113 Id. at 268. 
114 See id. at 266–67. 
115 Id. at 268. 
116 See generally Ugo Colella, Trust the Tale, Not the Author: Judicial Review of 
Legislative Motivation and the Problem of Proving A Racially Discriminatory Purpose Under 
the California Constitution, 69 TEMP. L. REV. 1081 (1996) (analyzing the application of 
Arlington Heights in subsequent cases). 
117 Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266. 
118 Id. at 265. 
119 Id. at 265–66. 
120 Id. at 265. 
121 Id. (emphasis added). 
1. COCKROFT (JWM Final) 6/15/2017 6:53 PM 
340 COCKROFT [Vol. 107 
meant to show whether an impermissible discriminatory purpose was one of 
many considerations that went into a decision. 
In the year following the decision in Village of Arlington Heights, the 
Supreme Court faced another case addressing the definition of “intent” for 
the purposes of equal protection. In Personnel Administrator of 
Massachusetts v. Feeney, the female plaintiff argued that the Massachusetts 
veterans’ preference statute discriminated against her because of her sex.122 
There, the plaintiff argued that “intent” for the purposes of equal protection 
ought to mean the same as “intent” within the context of criminal and civil 
law.123 In criminal and civil law, one “intends the natural and foreseeable 
consequences of his voluntary actions.”124 In arguing that the legislature 
knew that veterans were overwhelmingly male, the plaintiff argued that the 
law was purposely discriminatory since a decision to prefer veterans was, in 
its consequences, a decision to prefer men over women.125 As the lower court 
asked, “[w]here a law’s consequences are that inevitable, can they 
meaningfully be described as unintended?”126 
The Court, however, dismissed this argument. Discriminatory purpose 
implies “more than intent as volition or intent as awareness of 
consequences.”127 Intent, for the purposes of equal protection, requires that 
the decisionmaker “selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at 
least in part ‘because of,’ not merely ‘in spite of,’ its adverse effects upon an 
identifiable group.”128 Thus, discriminatory intent cannot be shown simply 
by demonstrating that a discriminatory consequence was the inevitable result 
of the decision or that the result was foreseeable. 
Feeney does not demonstrate a departure from the factors set forth in 
Village of Arlington Heights. Rather, the decision reaffirms that 
discriminatory effects are not in themselves evidence of discriminatory intent 
unless the effect is so great that discrimination is the only logical 
explanation.129 The Feeney decision merely dictates that awareness of 
inevitable or foreseeable effects is not a stand-in for an outright 
discriminatory classification.130 However, Feeney does not mean that 
evidence of discriminatory effects is irrelevant to an equal protection inquiry. 
 
122 442 U.S. 256, 259 (1979). 
123 Id. at 278. 
124 Id. 
125 Id. at 275. 
126 Feeney v. Massachusetts, 451 F. Supp. 143, 151 (Mass. 1978). 
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“If the impact of [a] statute could not be plausibly explained on a neutral 
ground, impact itself would signal that the real classification made by the law 
was in fact not neutral.”131 
Nearly a decade later, the Supreme Court again faced the issue of the 
relevance of discriminatory effect to determining discriminatory intent. In 
McCleskey v. Kemp, the Court considered a challenge to a Georgia man’s 
capital sentence.132 Particularly, the Court addressed “whether a complex 
statistical study that indicates a risk that racial considerations enter into 
capital sentencing determinations” is sufficient to prove that the petitioner’s 
capital sentence violates the Equal Protection Clause.133 In that case, the 
petitioner offered a study of over 2,000 murder cases that occurred in Georgia 
during the 1970s.134 The study, described by some scholars as “the most 
complex and thorough study of its kind, in terms of the size of the sample 
and the number of variables considered,”135 showed that “the death penalty 
was assessed in 22% of the cases involving black defendants and white 
victims; 8% of the cases involving white defendants and white victims; 1% 
of the cases involving black defendants and black victims; and 3% of the 
cases involving white defendants and black victims.”136 
Ultimately, the study concludes that “black defendants were 1.1 times 
as likely to receive a death sentence as other defendants.”137 The study 
“indicates that black defendants . . . who kill white victims have the greatest 
likelihood of receiving the death penalty.”138 
In disregarding the statistical analysis offered by the petitioner, the 
Court emphasized that, regardless of what the statistics showed, the petitioner 
had to prove that the “decisionmakers in his case acted with discriminatory 
purpose.”139 The Court offered three arguments for why the petitioner could 
not satisfy the burden of showing that his jury acted with discriminatory 
purpose using the statistics. 
 
131 Id. at 275. 
132 McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 282–83 (1987). 
133 Id. at 282–83. 
134 Id. at 286 (citing Baldus, et al., Pulaski, & Woodworth, Comparative Review of Death 
Sentences: An Empirical Study of the Georgia Experience, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 661 
(1983)). 
135 Steven F. Shatz, Terry Dalton, Challenging the Death Penalty with Statistics: Furman, 
McCleskey, and A Single County Case Study, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 1227, 1236 (2013). 
136 McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 286 (citations omitted). 
137 Id. at 287 (citations omitted). 
138 Id. 
139 Id. at 292. 
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First, the Court stressed, “each particular decision to impose the death 
penalty is made by a petit jury selected from a properly constituted venire.”140 
Since “[e]ach jury is unique in its composition . . . the application of an 
inference drawn from the general statistics to a specific decision in a trial and 
sentencing” is not appropriate.141 
Second, in other contexts where statistics are permitted to prove 
discrimination, “the decision-maker ha[d] an opportunity to explain the 
statistical disparity.”142 According to the Court, “public policy . . . dictate[s] 
that jurors ‘cannot be called . . . to testify to the motives and influences that 
led to their verdict.’”143 Moreover, given their wide discretion, it would be 
improper to require prosecutors “to defend their decisions to seek death 
penalties, ‘often years after they were made.’”144 
Third, “[b]ecause discretion is essential to the criminal justice process,” 
the Court “demand[s] exceptionally clear proof before infer[ring] that the 
discretion has been abused.”145 Given that each decision among each jury is, 
by its very nature, unique, the disparities demonstrated by petitioner’s study 
were deemed “insufficient to support an inference . . . of . . . discriminatory 
purpose” in McCleskey’s case.146 
Essential to each of the Court’s arguments is the nature and role of the 
decisionmaker. Unlike legislative bodies or courts, jurors and prosecutors are 
in a unique position where public policy dictates that the motivations of their 
decisions remain theirs and theirs alone. McCleskey’s challenge did not fail 
because a study cannot be evidence of discriminatory intent, nor did it fail 
because a demonstration of discriminatory effect is irrelevant to show 
discriminatory intent. “Despite the majority’s broad language, the brief 
holding of the Court was much narrower:” his challenge failed because juries 
and prosecutors make decisions that are tailored to the specific facts at hand, 
which the law affords great discretion. 147  
It is only because McCleskey could not offer a study to show that his 
jury was motivated by a discriminatory purpose that he did not prevail.148 
 
140 Id. at 294. 
141 Id. 
142 Id. at 296. 
143 Id. (quoting Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Babcock, 204 U.S. 585, 593 (1907) (alteration 
in original)). 
144 McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 296 (citation omitted). 
145 Id. at 297. 
146 Id. 
147 Steven F. Shatz, Terry Dalton, Challenging the Death Penalty with Statistics: Furman, 
McCleskey, and A Single County Case Study, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 1227, 1238 (2013). 
148 Id. at 294 (“Each jury is unique in its composition, and the Constitution requires that 
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McCleskey, then, at most stands for the proposition that when the 
decisionmaker is given nearly total discretion, general statistics may not by 
themselves sufficiently prove that said decisionmaker acted with 
discriminatory intent. 
C. THE DOCTRINE OF CONSTITUTIONAL AVOIDANCE 
When faced with a statute subject to two possible interpretations, one of 
which has constitutional implications, the court considering the statute should 
adopt the interpretation that avoids those constitutional issues.149 This is one 
of the many features of the doctrine of constitutional avoidance. Courts can 
similarly avoid constitutional issues in how they choose which legal issues 
to consider in deciding a case. 150 However, the cases with which this 
Comment is concerned present situations where a text is susceptible to 
multiple meanings, one of which compels consideration of constitutional 
issues. 
The text of a statute can sometimes have more than one possible 
meaning.151 It has been long settled that “if a statute has two possible 
meanings, one of which violates the Constitution, courts should adopt the 
meaning that does not do so.”152 Courts must choose the interpretation of an 
act that “save[s] the act.”153  
Constitutional avoidance can be thought of as a “substantive cannon of 
interpretation.”154 Rather than strictly being a cannon of textual 
interpretation, the constitutional avoidance cannon “typically focus[es] on 
the underlying values the cannon serves.”155 The cannon functions as a means 
of giving statutes their intended meanings; allowing “courts to refrain from 
striking down statutes full stop, functioning as ‘a means of giving effect to 
congressional intent, not of subverting it.’”156 Within the doctrine, the court 
 
its decision rest on consideration of innumerable factors that vary according to the 
characteristics of the individual defendant and the facts of the particular capital offense.”). See 
also John D. Bessler, Tinkering Around the Edges: The Supreme Court’s Death Penalty 
Jurisprudence, 49 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1913, 1916-17 (2012). 
149 Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2593 (2012). 
150 See Richard L. Hasen, Constitutional Avoidance and Anti-Avoidance by the Roberts 
Court, 2009 SUP. CT. REV. 181, 203 (2009). 
151 Id. (“To take a familiar example, a law that reads ‘no vehicles in the park’ might, or 
might not, ban bicycles in the park.”). 
152 Id. 
153 Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U.S. 142, 148 (1927) (Holmes, J., concurring). 
154 Gilbert Lee, How Many Avoidance Canons Are There After Clark v. Martinez?, 10 U. 
PA. J. CONST. L. 193, 198 (2007). 
155 Id. (citations omitted). 
156 Id. at 198-99 (quoting Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 382 (2005)). 
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assumes that Congress “intends to legislate within constitutional bounds,” 
thus binding the court “interpret the legislature’s work in any way that will 
result in its validation.”157 
There is no requirement that the interpretation that avoids the 
constitutional violation is the most natural one, “but only whether it is a 
‘fairly possible’ one.”158  Constitutional avoidance “dictates that judges 
refrain from wielding the power of judicial review if there is a statutory 
construction available to avoid doing so.”159 In fact, “every reasonable 
construction must be resorted to, in order to save a statute from 
unconstitutionality.”160 Thus, in considering how to interpret a particular 
statute, courts are obliged to choose interpretations of the statute that avoid 
constitutional issues or doubts.  
When analyzing whether the original Blewett panel correctly invoked 
this doctrine, there are two questions that must be asked: (1) Is the FSA 
susceptible to multiple interpretations?161 and (2) Is there a “fairly 
possible”162 interpretation that avoids “grave and doubtful constitutional 
questions?”163 
III. APPLYING THE JURISPRUDENCE TO THE BLEWETT DECISION 
The original Blewett panel held that the application of the mandatory 
minimums imposed by the Drug Act violated the equal protection principles 
of the Fifth Amendment.164 The court, as a state actor, is compelled to avoid 
the maintenance or legal effectuation of a discriminatory regime. As such, 
the court may not construct a statute so that it perpetuates such a 
discriminatory regime. With this position in mind the original Blewett panel 
reasoned that the discriminatory effect of the Drug Act’s sentencing regime 
coupled with the purpose of and statements contemporaneous to the passage 
of the FSA mandated that the court interpret the FSA so that it would apply 
retroactively.165 
 
157 William K. Kelley, Avoiding Constitutional Questions As A Three-Branch Problem, 86 
CORNELL L. REV. 831, 844 (2001). 
158 Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2594 (quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932)). 
159 See Kelley, supra note 157, at 845. 
160 Hooper v. California, 155 U.S. 648, 657 (1895). 
161 Id. at 384-85. 
162 Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. at 2594 (quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932)). 
163 United States ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. Del. & Hudson Co., 213 U.S. 366, 408 (1909). 
164 United States v. Blewett, 719 F.3d 482, 487 (6th Cir. 2013). 
165 Id.  
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A. OBLIGATIONS OF THE COURT AS A STATE ACTOR 
The court in Blewett correctly understood its obligation under the equal 
protection principles of the Fifth Amendment. The judiciary is not protected 
from constitutional violations merely because it enforces the laws offered by 
the legislature or even when it gives legal effect to private action.166 The 
dissent in Blewett does not offer any explicit criticism of the majority’s use 
of Shelley v. Kraemer; however, others have argued that the conclusion 
offered by the Court is illogical.167 
These critics argue that the logic of the Court would mean that once it 
becomes known that a law has a racially disparate impact, the maintenance 
of that law would be transformed into intentional discrimination.168 
According to this argument, such a conclusion is at odds with equal 
protection jurisprudence that permits racially disparate impacts, but not 
racially disparate treatment.169 
However, this argument fails in two respects. First, it assumes that 
courts following the original Blewett panel would treat all disparate impact 
claims similarly. These critics fail to acknowledge the severity of the impact 
the Court wishes to avoid, namely, statistics that just barely fail to reach the 
requirements of showing an automatic inference of racially discriminatory 
purpose.170 Second, in Shelley the Court acknowledged that the judicial 
maintenance of a discriminatory regime violated equal protection. In that 
case, the Court’s argument is that the maintenance, the legal empowering, of 
a discriminatory act constitutes a violation of equal protection.171 While it is 
true that in Shelley the act that would be given effect was, self-evidently, an 
act of pure intentional discrimination,172 that does not change the fact that 
certain consequences of a judicial decision ought to give rise to equal 
protection considerations. 
It is certainly consistent with modern equal protection jurisprudence that 
a pattern of discrimination and discriminatory effects, coupled with 
legislative history and other factors, may give rise to an inference of 
intentional discrimination, or at least that a continuance of such a regime 
 
166 Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 15–16 (1948). 
167 See supra note 60. 
168 Larkin, supra note 44, at 254; Whelan, supra note 60. 
169 See, e.g., Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979). 
170 United States v. Blewett, 719 F.3d 482, 487 (6th Cir. 2013) (“These alarming numbers 
are not unlike the Supreme Court’s early cases of facially neutral laws creating an 
overwhelmingly disparate result.”) (citing Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886)). 
171 Shelley, 334 U.S. at 15–16. 
172 Id. at 7–8. (The Court invalidated a racial restrictive covenant that, on its face, sought 
to exclude non-whites from the neighborhood). 
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could constitute purposeful discrimination.173 Thus, insofar as these 
criticisms discredit the role of the judiciary in engaging in intentional 
discrimination as a state actor, they are not consistent with case law. Courts 
are barred by the Constitution from giving legal effect to discrimination.174 
B. THE REQUIREMENT OF INTENT 
The original Blewett panel correctly demonstrated that the retroactive 
application of the FSA was mandated by the Drug Act’s racially disparate 
impact coupled with the fact Congress acknowledged and sought to rectify 
this impact in passing the FSA. The Blewett court gave two arguments 
analyzing why the failure to retroactively apply the FSA would constitute 
intentional discrimination for the purposes of equal protection. First, the court 
highlighted the discriminatory effect of the old 100:1 sentencing ratio. More 
specifically, the court highlighted the astonishing statistics demonstrating 
how the old sentencing ratio overwhelmingly disadvantaged African-
Americans. Of particular import was that under the 100:1 sentencing ratio, 
92.7% of the defendants in crack cases were non-white,175 that in between 
1988 and 1995, no whites were prosecuted under some of America’s biggest 
cities’ crack laws,176 and that the United States Sentencing Commission 
routinely, and often unanimously, suggested during the reign of the 100:1 
sentencing ratio that Congress change the ratio in order to avoid the “primary 
cause of the growing disparity between sentences for Black and White federal 
defendants.”177 According to the court, the continuation of such 
discriminatory effects would be “intentional subjugation or [a] 
discriminatory purpose case.”178 Put simply, the panel indicated it would be 
intentional discrimination for it to force the Blewett defendants to continue 
their pre-FSA sentence with the facts we know now. The court acknowledged 
that if it “continue[d] now with a construction of the statute that perpetuates 
the discrimination, there is no longer any defense that the discrimination is 
unintentional.”179 
 
173 See Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265–68 
(1977). 
174 See Shelley, 334 U.S. at 15-16. 
175 Blewett, 719 F.3d. at 487 (citing UNITED STATES SENT’G COMM’N, 2011 SOURCEBOOK 
OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS tbl.34 (2011)). 
176 Id. (citation omitted). 
177 Id. at 487–88 (quoting UNITED STATES SENT’G COMM’N, SPECIAL REPORT TO THE 
CONGRESS: COCAINE AND FEDERAL SENTENCING POLICY, at Chapter 7D (Feb. 1995)). 
178 Id. at 488. 
179 Id. 
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The dissent in Blewett argued that the court’s holding was barred by the 
Supreme Court’s decisions in Feeney and McCleskey. As discussed above, 
both of these cases limit the ways in which a court can consider disparate 
impact in finding intentional discrimination. However, neither of these cases 
invalidates the reasons offered by the majority. 
First, the Feeney decision does not make disparate impact issues 
disappear. In fact, the Court in Feeney acknowledges that when an otherwise 
neutral statute has a discriminatory impact that is unexplainable, then such 
effect may give rise to the inference of intentional discrimination.180 The 
Feeney decision only holds that awareness of possible disparate impact does 
not, on its own, demonstrate intentional discrimination for the purposes of 
equal protection.181 The majority in Blewett, however, offers more than just 
an awareness of the discriminatory consequences;182 it chronicles nearly two 
decades of unexplainable discriminatory effects.183 
Nor does McCleskey invalidate the original Blewett majority’s finding 
of intentional discrimination. The Supreme Court’s decision to refuse the 
data offered in McCleskey was not evidence of an aversion to statistics. 
Rather, the Court was concerned that general statistics offer little insight into 
particular decisions made by juries and prosecutors.184 Of particular concern 
for the Court was that the statistics offered by McCleskey did not show that 
his jury or his prosecutor acted with discriminatory intent.185 However, the 
Blewett court correctly argued that crack sentencing is different from the 
individual and particular considerations given in death penalty sentencing. In 
crack sentencing, “the defendant’s independent characteristics do not factor 
into the equation, and the decisionmaker’s choice is a discretionless 
mandatory minimum.”186 In crack sentencing, the charge will be “based on 
an objectively verifiable quantity of crack, and the court will impose a 
sentence no lower than that mandated by Congress.”187 Therefore, unlike the 
decisions in McCleskey, where discretion was the central feature of the 
 
180 Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 275 (1979). 
181 Id. at 279. 
182 The court does, however, show that over the course of several years Congress refused 
the advice of the United States Sentencing Commission to reduce the 100:1 sentencing ratio 
because of its unnecessary, discriminatory effect. Blewett, 719 F.3d at 487–88. 
183 See id. 
184 McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 293–96 (1987). 
185 Id. at 297. 
186 Blewett, 719 F.3d at 489. 
187 Id. (citing David A. Sklansky, Cocaine, Race, and Equal Protection, 47 STAN. L. REV. 
1283, 1316-18 (1995)). 
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sentence, the types of decisions in crack sentencing are so mechanical that 
sentencing is merely the direct application of the law. 
It is true that the court must show more than disparate impact to give 
rise to the inference that intentional discrimination is at work.188 This is 
especially true since no other circuit court has ever held that the old 100:1 
sentencing regime violated equal protection despite its discriminatory 
effect.189 
The original Blewett panel, however, does offer more. What makes the 
Blewett decision different from previous decisions permitting the 100:1 
sentencing ratio is that none of those prior cases addressed the equal 
protection issue following the passage of the FSA. The legislative history of 
the FSA, along with statements made by the FSA’s proponents, evidence 
Congress’s determination that the 100:1 ratio constituted impermissible 
discrimination. 
It is without question what the purpose of the FSA was. The FSA was 
an attempt to remedy the race-based disparity created by the old sentencing 
ratio. Given that the main criticism offered against the majority in Blewett is 
that it relies on a finding of disparate impact, it is important to chronicle all 
of the statements made by the law’s proponents as well as other influential 
lawmakers along with the purpose of the FSA itself. 
The FSA was adopted “because the public had come to understand 
sentences embodying the 100:1 ratio as reflecting unjustified race-based 
differences.”190 In fact, the preamble to the law signifies itself as “[a]n Act to 
restore fairness to Federal cocaine sentencing.”191 The Chairman of the 
Senate Judiciary Committee, Senator Patrick Leahy, when reflecting on the 
purpose of the FSA, stated that the former 100:1 ratio is “one of the most 
notorious symbols of racial discrimination in the modern criminal justice 
system.”192 
Congress acknowledged that the basis of the old sentencing regime was 
either misplaced or simply incorrect. Senator Dick Durbin, one of the FSA’s 
sponsors, quoted Vice President Joe Biden as saying that “[e]ach of the myths 
upon which we based the disparity has since been dispelled or altered.”193 
Representative Robert C. Scott, then-Chairman of the House Judiciary 
 
188 Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979). 
189 See, e.g., United States v. Clary, 34 F.3d 709 (8th Cir. 1994). See also LaJuana Davis, 
Rock, Powder, Sentencing—Making Disparate Impact Evidence Relevant in Crack Cocaine 
Sentencing, 14 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 375, 397 (2011). 
190 Dorsey v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2321, 2328 (2012). 
191 Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372 (2010). 
192 156 Cong. Rec. S1683 (daily ed. Mar. 17, 2010). 
193 155 Cong. Rec. S10491 (daily ed. Oct. 15, 2009). 
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Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism and Homeland Security, stated that “[w]e 
are not blaming anybody for what happened in 1986, but we have had years 
of experience and have determined that there is no justification for the 100-
to-1 ratio.”194 There was even acknowledgement of just how arbitrary the 
100:1 sentencing ratio was. Representative Daniel E. Lungren recalled that 
“[Congress] initially came out of committee with a 20-to-1 ratio. By the time 
we finished on the floor, it was 100-to-1. We didn’t really have an evidentiary 
basis for it, but that’s what we did, thinking we were doing the right thing at 
the time.”195 
Finally, Congress acknowledged, with very precise language, how the 
old sentencing regime ran contrary to the equal protection principles of the 
Constitution. Senator Patrick Leahy argued that “[t]he racial imbalance that 
has resulted from the cocaine sentencing disparity disparages the 
Constitution’s promise of equal treatment for all Americans.”196 The House 
Majority Whip at the time, Representative James E. Clyburn, stated that 
[t]he current drug sentencing policy is the single greatest cause of the record levels of 
incarceration in our country. One in every thirty-one Americans is in prison or on parole 
or on probation, including one in eleven African-Americans. This is unjust and runs 
contrary to our fundamental principle of equal protection under the law.197 
Representative Steny Hoyer put it simply: “The 100-to-1 disparity is 
counterproductive and unjust.”198 
There was even acknowledgement that the FSA would repeal the 
existing, unjust 100:1 ratio. Senator Richard Durbin argued that 
[t]his is the first time the Senate Judiciary Committee has ever reported a bill to reduce 
the crack-powder disparity, and if this bill is enacted into law, it will be the first time 
since 1970-40 years ago that Congress has repealed a mandatory minimum sentence. 
Every day that passes without taking action to solve this problem is another day that 
people are being sentenced under a law that virtually everyone agrees is unjust. If this 
bill is enacted into law, it will immediately ensure that every year, thousands of people 
are treated more fairly in our criminal justice system.199 
In fact, in a letter written to the Honorable Patti B. Saris of the United 
State Sentencing Commission, Senators Patrick Leahy, Richard Durbin, Al 
Franken and Christopher Coons asked the Commission to apply the FSA 
retroactively.200 In that letter, the Senators argued that to disallow retroactive 
 
194 156 Cong. Rec. H6202 (daily ed. July 28, 2010). 
195 Id. (emphasis added). 
196 156 Cong. Rec. S1682 (daily ed. Mar. 17, 2010). 
197 156 Cong. Rec. H6198 (daily ed. July 28, 2010). 
198 156 Cong. Rec. H6203 (daily ed. July 28, 2010). 
199 156 Cong. Rec. S1681 (daily ed. Mar. 17, 2010) (emphasis added). 
200 See Letter from Patrick Leahy, U.S. Sen., Richard Durbin, U.S. Sen., Al Franken, U.S. 
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application of the FSA would “be entirely inconsistent with the primary 
purposes of the 2011 Amendment and the Fair Sentencing Act: reducing 
racial disparities in drug sentencing, increasing trust in the justice system 
and focusing limited resources on serious offenders.”201 They directed that 
the Commission apply the FSA retroactively to “ensure that individuals in 
our federal prisons are not serving disproportionate and racially disparate 
sentences because of the date of their sentencing.”202 
Amid these statements professing the purpose of the FSA, 
acknowledging the arbitrariness of the old sentencing regime, and plainly 
stating that the old sentencing regime undermined equal protection, Congress 
passed the FSA. The opinion of the original Blewett panel, then, offered more 
than the disparate impact of the old sentencing regime as evidence of the 
“grave and doubtful constitutional questions.”203 The court offered the 
extensive legislative history, the most important factor when accounting for 
discriminatory purpose in a legislative body.204 
In response, critics have offered three reasons for why the legislative 
intent behind the FSA is insufficient to show an equal protection problem 
with enforcing the old sentencing regime. First, they argue that if the 100:1 
sentencing ratio is discriminatory, then why not the amended 18:1 sentencing 
ratio to make it 1:1?205 This argument assumes that the original Blewett panel 
did not offer “a constitutionally relevant distinction between the old ratio and 
the new ratio” that was sufficient to justify an equal protection claim.206 
However, the majority did provide such a distinction. The majority’s reliance 
on the legislative history of the FSA demonstrates, in great detail, how the 
100:1 ratio was “the single greatest cause of the record levels of incarceration 
in our country.”207 Every single time the majority offered arguments of 
Congresspersons, each argument contained either implicit or explicit 
comparisons between the new and old sentencing ratio. Moreover, given just 
how disparate the impact of the 100:1 sentencing ratio was, it stands to reason 
 
Sen., and Christopher Coons, U.S. Sen., to the Honorable Patti B. Saris, U.S. Sent. Comm. 
(June 1, 2011) available at http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/amendment-process/
public-comment/20110602/Durbin_Leahy_Franken_Coons_Comment.pdf. 
201 Id. (emphasis added). 
202 Id. 
203 United States ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. Del. & Hudson Co., 213 U.S. 366, 408 (1909). 
204 Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265–68 (1977) (noting 
that legislative history is “highly relevant” where every other factor is only considered 
“relevant”). 
205 United States v. Blewett, 719 F.3d 482, 496 (6th Cir. 2013) (Gilman, J., dissenting). 
206 Id. 
207 156 Cong. Rec. H6198 (daily ed. July 28, 2010). 
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that reducing the effect of that impact by more than 80% would do more than 
enough to demonstrate how the new ratio avoids violating equal protection.  
What’s more, even if it were true that the 18:1 sentencing ratio was also 
discriminatory, it is unclear why that fact would lead one to conclude that the 
clearly more discriminatory 100:1 ratio should still be applied. What is 
relevant is that Congress acknowledged the folly of the 100:1 ratio when it 
implemented the new 18:1 ratio. The fact that this explicit comparison exists 
in the congressional record is sufficient acknowledgment that the old 
minimums were discriminatory and that new minimums were less 
discriminatory and less onerous.  
The second criticism offered is that the original Blewett panel 
misunderstood how legislative intent is treated within equal protection 
analysis because it held that Congress acted with discriminatory intent 
through an act of recklessness or negligence-failing to make the new 
minimums retroactive.208 This argument relies on the assumption that the 
Blewett panel considered Congress’s failure to pass a law like the FSA for 
twenty-four years as the equal protection problem in the case; that Congress’s 
failure to act violates the Constitution. 
This argument fails on multiple fronts. First, it mischaracterizes the 
argument of the Blewett majority. The original Blewett panel does not argue 
that Congress acted with discriminatory purpose or negligence in 2010. 
Rather the Blewett majority discerned the intent of Congress in passing the 
FSA, acknowledging that it would bring grave constitutional concerns if 
Congress simultaneously acknowledged that past sentences under the Drug 
Act were discriminatory yet it continued to enforce them.209 Second, as was 
explained above in Part II, a finding of discriminatory intent requires 
investigating numerous factors, including the legislative history and the 
disparate effect, if it reaches sufficient levels, of a particular law or 
administrative decision.210 The reason that disparate impact cases have not 
shown sufficient evidence to give rise to the inference of intent is that there 
is often nothing more than the discriminatory impact, nothing in the 
legislative or administrative record detailing how discrimination took 
place.211 But what could be more persuasive evidence of impermissible 
discrimination than Congress acknowledging that it acted wrongly? Its action 
in 1986 gave rise to, in the words of one of the FSA proponents,  “one of the 
most notorious symbols of racial discrimination in the modern criminal 
 
208 Larkin, supra note 44, at 258. 
209 See Blewett, 719 F.3d at 488. 
210 Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266–68 (1977). 
211 See supra Part I.B. 
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justice system.”212 To prove intentional discrimination all that is necessary is 
to show that discrimination was a motivating factor in the decision by the 
governmental body.213 The Blewett court did that and more by demonstrating, 
not just that the old sentencing ratio had a discriminatory impact, but that 
Congress acknowledged that impact (by stating that it was discriminatory and 
arbitrary), and that Congress desired that such discrimination be stopped.  
Finally, the majority in Blewett II argue that the original Blewett panel’s 
“theory of discrimination . . . makes little sense” because it assumes that 
Congress was “deeply concerned about racial justice when looking at future 
sentences,” but “suddenly became racist when contemplating past 
sentences[.]”214 Rather than simply stating that the original Blewett panel 
offered an incoherent reading of Congress’s intent in passing the FSA, the 
majority in Blewett II attempts to close the loop. According to the Blewett II 
majority, the reason Congress was only concerned about future sentences, as 
opposed to those sentences already imposed, was that “[t]he government has 
a powerful interest in avoiding the disruption of final sentences.”215  
However, the Blewett II majority places far too much emphasis on the 
FSA’s concern for the finality of sentences. Indeed, the FSA “permits a slew 
of similarly situated crack offenders to disrupt finality” of their respective 
sentences.216 The majority and the Government agreed that those sentenced 
above the 100:1 ratio-presumably the more serious offender-may disrupt the 
finality of their sentences in seeking a reduction in line with the minimums 
set forth in the Drug Act.217 Yet the majority and the Government would deny 
such a reduction to an individual sentenced at the 100:1 minimum-
presumably a less serious offender.218  
What’s more, the Blewett II majority’s reliance on the interest In finality 
begs the question: what is the finality in service of? Surely an interest in 
finality cannot, with that proclamation alone, avoid the system that “finality” 
reproduces. Quite the contrary, “[t]here is little societal interest in permitting 
the criminal process to rest at a point where it ought properly never to 
repose.”219 Indeed, finality is of little importance when it is nothing more than 
a “euphemism for ossifying an arbitrary and discriminatory classification.”220 
 
212 156 Cong. Rec. S1683 (daily ed. Mar. 17, 2010) (citation omitted). 
213 Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 265–66. 
214 United States v. Blewett, 746 F.3d 647, 659 (6th Cir. 2013). 
215 Id. (citations omitted). 
216 Id. at 674 (Cole, J., dissenting). 
217 Id. 
218 Id. 
219 Id. (quoting Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 313-14 (1989)). 
220 Brief of Amicus Curiae NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., in Support 
1. COCKROFT (JWM Final) 6/15/2017 6:53 PM 
2017] CONGRESS BLEWETT 353 
It is difficult to see how “finality can support criminal convictions and overly 
onerous sentences based upon a premise that Congress has overwhelmingly 
and demonstrably acknowledged to be false as of the day it was passed.”221 
Rather than “finality” answering the concerns offered by the original Blewett 
panel, such a state interest only reinforces the original panel’s argument: 
finality cannot force the Blewetts to serve sentences that Congress 
acknowledged were unfair and discriminatory.  
C. CONSTITUTIONAL AVOIDANCE 
The original Blewett panel held that the constitutional avoidance 
doctrine compelled the court to accept an interpretation of the retroactivity of 
the FSA that avoids violating the equal protection principles inherent in the 
Fifth Amendment.222  
In Blewett, the Government argued that the FSA ought not be applied 
retroactively because a mandatory minimum does not fit the language in the 
applicable statute: “sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered by 
the Sentencing Commission.”223 The Government argued that the Blewetts’ 
sentences could not be retroactively lowered because they did not fall in the 
narrow exception provided by the Sentencing Guidelines.224 Essentially, the 
Government stated that “a court may consider a defendant for a sentencing 
reduction only ‘in the case of a defendant who has been sentenced to a term 
of imprisonment based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been 
lowered by the Sentencing Commission.”225 Since the Blewetts had been 
sentenced based on a statutory minimum, not on a guideline range, and the 
Sentencing Commission did not lower their guideline range or statutory 
minimum, the court may not reduce their sentence.226 Put simply, even 
though the FSA reduced the statutory minimum for crack offenses, since the 
 
of Defendants-Appellants, at 18. United States v. Blewett, 719 F.3d 482 (6th Cir. 2013) (No. 
12-5226). 
221 Blewett II at 684 (Clay, J., dissenting). 
222 United States v. Blewett, 719 F.3d 482, 487 (6th Cir. 2013). 
223 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) (West 2012) (“[I]n the case of a defendant who has been 
sentenced to a term of imprisonment based on a sentencing range that has subsequently been 
lowered by the Sentencing Commission . . . the court may reduce the term of imprisonment, 
after considering the factors set forth in section 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable, 
if such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing 
Commission.”). 
224 Supplemental Brief for Appellee United States of America, at 6-7. United States v. 
Blewett, 719 F.3d 482 (6th Cir. 2013) (No. 12-5226). 
225 Brief for Appellee United States of America, at 19, United States v. Blewett, 719 F.3d 
482 (6th Cir. 2013) (No. 12-5226) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2)). 
226 Id. at 19. 
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Sentencing Commission itself did not lower the sentencing range, the 
Blewetts cannot have their sentences reduced.  
The court held that the Government’s interpretation of the FSA ought to 
be rejected given that it would result in a violation of equal protection as 
explained above.227  
First, the Blewett court analyzed whether the language and purpose of 
the FSA would, by itself, justify retroactivity even without considering 
constitutional issues.228 The analysis provided by the court gives more than 
the “fairly possible”229 reading of the statute required to activate the doctrine 
of constitutional avoidance.  
In the FSA Congress sought to reduce crack sentences by increasing the 
drug amounts “triggering mandatory minimums for crack offenses from five 
grams to twenty-eight grams in respect to the five-year minimum.”230 
In the face of the Government’s interpretation of the statute, the Blewett 
panel favored the less constitutionally problematic interpretation offered by 
the Blewetts: that statutory minimums condition and limit the guideline 
range, so when the statutory minimum is reduced, then the guideline is also 
reduced.231 If the sentencing range offered to the defendants is the main issue, 
then nothing could be more relevant than the mandatory minimums that apply 
to that defendant.232 Mandatory minimums and maximums provide the 
“bookends” for the guideline range.233 The Sentencing Commission instructs 
judges to view mandatory minimums within the context of the suggested 
guideline range, allowing the applicable guideline range to condition 
minimum sentencing.234 As an example, “if a defendant’s guideline range is 
fifty to seventy months with a statutory minimum of sixty months,” the actual 
range is “sixty to seventy months.”235 If the statutory minimum changes and 
takes it out of the offender’s guideline range, then the range has been lowered. 
This contradicts the Government’s argument, since the Government treats the 
 
227 Blewett, 719 F.3d at 490. 
228 Id. at 491. 
229 Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932). 
230 Blewett, 719 F.3d at 491 (quoting Dorsey v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2321, 2329 
(2012)); see also Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111–220, 124 Stat 2372 (2010). 
231 Brief for Appellants Cornelius Demorris Blewett and Jarreous Jamone Blewitt, at 3-5, 
United States v. Blewett, 719 F.3d 482 (6th Cir. 2013) (No. 12-5226). 
232 Blewett, 719 F.3d at 491 (“The mandatory minimums and maximums are an integral 
part of and gave rise to the sentencing guideline ranges.”). 
233 Id. 
234 U.S.S.G. § 5G1.1(b) (2013) (“Where a statutorily required minimum sentence is greater 
than the maximum of the applicable guideline range, the statutorily required minimum 
sentence shall be the guideline sentence.”). 
235 Blewett, 719 F.3d at 492. 
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statutory minimums and the guideline ranges as separate inquiries and not 
working in tandem. The revised crack guidelines are therefore mandated by 
the new mandatory minimums. The mandatory minimum for crack cocaine 
was lowered and, therefore, the Blewetts’ guideline range was also lowered. 
Moreover, the original Blewett panel’s rationale can be understood by 
looking to the Supreme Court’s decision in Dorsey.236 In finding that the 
FSA’s 18:1 sentencing ratio ought to apply to those offenders whose offenses 
predated the act, but whose sentences postdated the act, the Court in Dorsey 
offered a series of considerations finding that the statute pointed “clearly in 
that direction.”237 
First, the Supreme Court noted that applying the old sentencing regime 
to those offenders whose offenses predated the act, but whose sentences 
postdated the act, would “create disparities of a kind that Congress enacted 
the Sentencing Reform Act and the Fair Sentencing Act to prevent.”238 In so 
finding, the Court considered the sentencing outcomes of two hypothetical 
individuals with the same number of prior offenses who each engaged in the 
same criminal conduct involving the same amount of crack.239 Prior to the 
enactment, an offender with five grams of crack would be subject to a 
mandatory five-year minimum sentence, whereas the same offender, 
sentenced after the enactment of the FSA, would be subject to a guideline 
range of twenty-one to twenty-seven months.240 
The Blewett panel also recognized that failing to apply the FSA 
retroactively would lead to the sort of disparate results Congress was 
intending to avoid. Under the argument offered by the Government, the 
offenders in Blewett would “remain in prison for ten years when under the 
new guidelines they would be subject to no minimum at all.”241 Even more 
problematic, under the Government’s argument “major drug kingpins” would 
be given the “greatest benefit of retroactivity because their amended 
guideline range is above the mandatory minimum”242 while offenders like the 
Blewetts would not receive the benefits of the FSA because they were 
 
236 Dorsey v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2321 (2012). 
237 Id. at 2332 (emphasis added). 
238 Id. at 2333. 
239 Id. 
240 Id. 
241 United States v. Blewett, 719 F.3d 482, 492 (6th Cir. 2013). 
242 Id. These hypothetical offenders would not have been sentenced based on the statutory 
minimum because they possessed greater amounts of crack. Since they were not sentenced 
based on the statutory minimum of the Drug Act, these offenders would have been sentenced 
within the Sentencing Guideline ranges, meaning that their guidelines would likely have been 
“lowered” within the interpretation of the guidelines offered by the government. 
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charged based on the mandatory minimum.243 Such a reading of the FSA 
would hardly eliminate the unfairness Congress attempted to remedy with the 
passage of the act.244 
Critics, however, claimed that the original Blewett panel either misstated 
or misused the doctrine of constitutional avoidance. The dissent’s primary 
argument in Blewett was that the panel’s reading of the FSA and revised 
Sentencing Guidelines was precluded by the Sixth Circuit’s decision in 
United States v. Hammond.245 In Hammond, the court interpreted the FSA to 
not apply retroactively.246 Specifically, the court interpreted the phrase 
“sentencing range”247 within the Sentencing Guidelines differently than the 
original Blewett panel.248 The dissent argued that, given this contrary reading 
by another Sixth Circuit panel, the majority falsely invoked the constitutional 
avoidance doctrine since there were not two possible interpretations.249 In 
essence, the dissent claims that the Hammond decision is binding precedent 
on how the court could interpret the sentencing guidelines. With that binding 
precedent, there are not two different interpretations to choose from.250 
While it is true that for the doctrine to be invoked there must be at least 
two possible interpretations of the statute, one cannot foreclose an 
interpretation simply because the issue has been decided by another court.251 
The court must only find a “fairly possible” reading that clears constitutional 
muster, not necessarily the most natural one.252 A court may decide that a 
less-than-perfect statute is sufficient in order to avoid a constitutional issue. 
It is quite possible that the reading offered by the dissent and the Hammond 
court is the most natural reading or even the best reading, but that is not what 
the case law requires when attempting to avoid a constitutional issue. For 
example, the Supreme Court in National Federation of Independent Business 
v. Sebelius upheld the individual healthcare mandate under Congress’s taxing 
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power.253 There, Congress labeled the mandate as a “penalty” within the 
Affordable Care Act. The Court has held in the past that Congress does not 
have the power to penalize through its taxing power.254 Central to the 
majority’s argument was that the most natural reading, one that merely reads 
the term as it is, does not bind the Court if such a reading would cause a 
violation of the Constitution.255 
Therefore, pointing out that there is a better reading of the statutory 
provision is not a sufficient criticism of the Blewett majority’s interpretation. 
This is especially true since the court in Hammond was not faced with a 
constitutional challenge to the application of the Drug Act’s mandatory 
minimums and the court did not raise the issue themselves. Here, the court 
did as the cannon of constitutional avoidance instructed. The court gave 
“effect to congressional intent”256 by interpreting the FSA so that the 
discriminatory effects of the Drug Act could be avoided.  
CONCLUSION 
In April 2014, the Obama Administration took a step in the right 
direction by announcing new rules to provide clemency for many of the 
offenders that continued to serve sentences under the old 100:1 minimums.257 
However, even after the enactment of these new rules, thousands of offenders 
still remain in prison based on the old, pre-FSA sentencing guidelines.258 
Indeed, although President Obama concluded his presidency “having granted 
clemency to more people convicted of federal crimes than any chief 
executive in 64 years,”259 the Trump Administration is likely to take a harder 
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258 See Sari Horwitz, Justice Department Prepares for Clemency Requests from 
Thousands of Inmates, THE WASHINGTON POST (April 21, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.
com/world/national-security/justice-department-prepares-for-clemency-requests-from-
thousands-of-inmates/2014/04/21/43237688-c964-11e3-a75e-463587891b57_story.html, 
archived at http://perma.cc/3LWA-YPZT. 
259 See John Gramlich & Kristen Bialik, Obama used clemency power more often than any 
president since Truman, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (January 20, 2017),  
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/01/20/obama-used-more-clemency-power/. 
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line on issues of criminal enforcement.260 
The original Blewett panel provided a novel solution to a novel issue. In 
normal equal protection cases, the state or federal government explicitly 
discriminates by way of categorizing the individuals against whom an act 
will apply, or an act is explicitly adopted with discriminatory purpose. The 
issue considered in Blewett concerns a variety of factors that, if taken alone, 
may not rise to the level of an equal protection violation. Courts have found 
that Congress did not have the discriminatory intent sufficient to violate equal 
protection when it passed the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, despite evidence 
that discrimination could have been at work. Twenty-four years of the Drug 
Act’s disastrous consequences gave rise to even more challenges on the basis 
that the Drug Act had a discriminatory effect, but this effect alone did not rise 
to the level of an equal protection violation. And even when Congress 
attempted to remedy more than two decades worth of discrimination, it did 
not do so in a way that, based on text alone, would overturn the sentences of 
those that Congress otherwise acknowledged were wrongly sentenced. Only 
when all these factors coalesced could a valid constitutional argument be 
made. 
It should be further noted that the logic of the Blewett decision has the 
potential to broaden the way equal protection is treated. Indeed, even while 
writing in concurrence with the majority in Blewett II, Judge Karen Nelson 
Moore, explained that “rather than protecting our citizens, the [Drug Act] has 
led to the mass incarceration of African-American men and has bred distrust 
of law enforcement in the larger African-American community. It is time that 
the federal judiciary determines again whether the Constitution abides such 
actions.”261  
Few people could reasonably argue that the 100:1 sentencing ratio for 
crack made sense. The effect on the African-American community is not and 
was not reasonably justified. Despite this clear indication of discrimination, 
it was never struck down as violating equal protection because there was 
insufficient evidence of discriminatory intent, largely because the standard 
for intent creates a high threshold. The United States has a “long history of 
facially race-neutral laws targeting African-Americans.”262 It is difficult to 
 
260 See Matt Apuzzo, After Obama Push for Clemency, Hints of Reversal Likely to Come, 
New York Times (Nov. 22, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/22/us/politics/obama-
commutations-criminal-justice-trump.html. 
261 United States v. Blewett, 746 F.3d 647, 668 (6th Cir. 2013) (Moore, J.,  concurring). 
262 Brief of Amicus Curiae NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., in Support 
of Defendants-Appellants, at 17-18. United States v. Blewett, 719 F.3d 482 (6th Cir. 2013) 
(No. 12-5226) (citing Douglas A. Blackmon, Slavery By Another Name: The Re-Enslavement 
of Black Americans from the Civil War to World War II 53 (2008)). 
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argue that the Drug Act was not an example of this shameful history. It was 
not until Congress acknowledged the widely held view that the old 
sentencing ratio exploited and accelerated the Drug War’s effect on the 
African-American community that the 100:1 ratio could finally be put to rest. 
It was not until Congress explained why the old ratio was unjustified and 
discriminatory that a court could constitutionally find it to be in violation of 
equal protection. 
The Blewett court correctly identified the issues involved. The FSA is 
susceptible to multiple, fair interpretations. One of those interpretations, the 
one adopted by the original panel, avoids constitutional questions posed by 
applying the mandatory minimums of the Drug Act following the passage of 
the FSA. If the FSA were to be read in any other way, and the court had to 
uphold sentences imposed under the old regime, the court would have to give 
legal effect to discrimination, something that courts are prohibited by the 
Constitution from doing. The discrimination was not just evidenced by the 
overwhelming, persuasive statistics of how discriminatory the old crack 
sentencing ratio was, but also by the statements of Congresspersons when the 
FSA was enacted. Congress intended to put an end to the effect of the old, 
arbitrary and discriminatory sentencing ratio. The original Blewett panel 
endeavored to ensure that the statute realized its intended purpose. 
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